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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal before the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to
the jurisdiction conferred on the court by Utah Code Ann.
§78-2-2 (3) (j) (1953 as amended).

The Division of Real Estate

(hereafter "Division") appeals seeking judicial review of an
Order of the Fifth Judicial District Court for Washington County
directing the payment of $23,000 from the Real Estate Recovery
Fund (hereafter "Fund" or "Recovery Fund") to the four
respondents in the amounts of $5,750 each (total of $23,000).
The Division seeks to limit the recovery to $10,000, while
respondents seek to expand the recovery to $29,026*51.

DISPOSITION BELOW
On April 9, 1987, following a trial held January 30, 1987,
the Court entered its "Findings of Fact and Conclusions Of Law"
and a "Judgment" (R 84-90) for respondents and against the real
estate licensee, Steven Carter and his company, SRC Investment
Company (hereafter "Carter"), for $34,026.31.

This judgment

included $5,000.00 in punitive damages, which the parties agree
cannot be collected from the Recovery Fund.

The balance of the

$29,026.31 judgment is comprised of $23,000.00 damages (R 43-45),
$5,740.00 attorney's fees, and $286.31 costs.

After failing to

obtain payment from Carter, respondents, on May 16, 1988,
petitioned the District Court for an order directing the Division
to pay respondents $29,026.31 out of the Recovery Fund.

The

Division objected to the payment of any more than $10,000.00.
Hearing was held on July 12, 1988, and the District Court granted

respondents1 petition in the amount of $23,000.00, or $5,750.00
for each of the four individual respondents.

The District Court

applied the current version of the statute and refused to include
attorney's fees or costs, thereby limiting the recovery to
$23,000.00.

The Division has timely appealed.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the District Court correctly interpreted the

Real Estate Recovery Fund Act (hereafter "Act") to allow recovery
on a "per person" or "per claimant" basis, or whether the Court
should have held that since only one parcel of real estate was
involved, that there was only one "transaction", and limited
recovery on a "per transaction" basis to only $10,000, regardless
of the number of victims and regardless of the number of
fraudulent acts by the real estate licensee?
2.

Whether the Division, more than a year after the

judgment against the real estate licensee became final, can
attack the District Court's findings and judgment entered April
9, 1987 setting forth five fraudulent acts by the real estate
licensee and concluding that the judgment entered was based on
"••• five transactions of fraud and misrepresentation", when the
Division was served with notice of the action at the time the
complaint was filed and failed to intervene in the action?

Does

res judicata, waiver or estoppel apply to preclude the Division's
claim that there was only one transaction so only one payment of
$10,000 is required?

3.

Whether the District Court correctly held that its

decision was governed by the law in effect at the time the
petition was filed (May 16, 1988), or whether its decision should
have been governed by the law in effect at the time the cause of
action arose against the real estate licensee and notice served
on the Division (January and February, 1986).

If the latter,

does this law allow recovery of attorney's fees and costs in
addition to the $23,000 awarded by the District Court?

STATUTES DETERMINATIVE OF THIS CASE
The following statutes are determinative of this case, and
must therefore be considered by the Court:
1.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-2a-l, et. seq. (1953, as amended)

known as the "Utah Real Estate Recovery Act."

These statutes are

reproduced in full in the Appendix to appellant1s brief.
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 61-2a-5(l), in effect in January and

February, 1986, as follows:
11

(1) If any person obtains a final judgment in a court of
competent jurisdiction against a real estate licensee in
this state, based upon fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit
in any real estate transaction, that person may, upon
termination of all proceedings including appeals, file a
verified petition in the court where the judgment was
entered for an order directing payment from the Real Estate
Education, Research, and Recovery Fund for the actual
damages included in the judgment and unpaid, but not more
than $10,000. Recovery from the fund shall be for the
actual damages included in the judgment and unpaid, but not
more than $10,000 for a single transaction and no more than
$50,000 for any one licensee."
3.

Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (1953, as amended), as follows:

"No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless
expressly so declared."

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmance of the District's Court decision
allowing each respondent to recover $5,750.00 from the Recovery
Fund, for a total of $23,000.00.

Respondents also seek a

determination by the Supreme Court that the District Court should
have applied the statute in effect when the cause of action
arose, and a ruling that said statute permits attorney's fees and
costs to be recovered as damages.
Should the Supreme Court determine that the claims of the
four individual respondents must be aggregated as one claim
because only one parcel of real property was involved, then
respondents ask the Supreme Court to affirm the decision on the
independent ground that the the findings and judgment entered
against the real estate licensee on April 9, 1987 was based on
five transactions of fraud and misrepresentation which the
Division cannot attack more than a year after that judgment
became final, and that respondents can recover up to $10,000 on
each transaction, limited to $50,000 against any one licensee and
further limited to the amount of their judgment, less punitive
damages, or $29,026.51.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 27, 1974 respondents entered into a Uniform Real
Estate Contract with Carter to purchase a parcel of real property
(Trial Ex. P-2). An escrow was established at Southern Utah
Title Company to receive and disburse the eight annual payments
required by the contract.

However, Carter prevailed upon the

McBrides to send some of the annual payments directly to him, but
Carter did not have those payments processed through the escrow
records.

By November 15, 1982, the contract was fully paid, and

McBrides were entitled to have Carter sign and record a Warranty
Deed, but none was recorded.
Carter at that time was indebted to Dr. Lee Atkin on
unrelated transactions, and Dr. Atkin was pressing for payment
and/or security for the debt.

Carter falsely represented to Dr.

Atkin that McBrides still owed him $10,112.67 on the contract,
which Dr. Atkin was able to confirm by the escrow records since
Carter had received several annual payments that were not
processed through the escrow.

Carter was therefore able to

persuade Dr. Atkin to accept an assignment of the balance of
the McBride contract, secured by a Trust Deed for $39,733.50
(Trial Ex. P-5) on McBrides1 property and other parcels. The
Trust Deed was signed by Carter on January 21, 1983 and recorded
June 2, 1983.

Not until after this Trust Deed was recorded did

Carter sign and record (on July 6, 1983) a Warranty Deed
conveying the property to McBrides (Trial Ex. P-6) .
Later, when Dr. Atkin did not receive the annual payments he
expected, he requested Carter to take action.

Carter complied on

July 6, 1984 by signing his name to a Notice Of Default (Trial
Ex. P-8), but mailed it to an old address for McBrides knowing it
would not be received, in order to delay the discovery by
McBrides of his fraudulent acts.

Since McBrides made no further

payments, Dr. Atkin proceeded with a Trust Deed foreclosure.
McBrides learned of the foreclosure before the Trustee's sale,

and were forced to purchase the property a second time at the
Trustee 1 s sale, which was held on January 16, 1986.
McBrides filed a complaint against Carter with the Division
in January, 1986 and on February 7, 1986 McBrides commenced this
action by filing a complaint against Carter to recover their
damages.

A copy of the complaint was mailed to the Division on

February 6, 1986 (R 97). The Division did not intervene in the
lawsuit between McBrides and Carter, but did proceed on the
complaint against Carter's license.

Effective October 19, 1987,

the Division revoked Carter's license based on his failure to
remit funds and for engaging in dishonest dealings (R 97).
After being served with the complaint, Carter acknowledged
his fraudulent conduct and debt to McBrides by entering into a
"Settlement Agreement" (R 43-45), in which he agreed to pay
McBrides $23,000 and also agreed that his debt to McBrides was
based upon fraud and was not dischargeable in bankruptcy.

When

Carter failed to make any of the agreed payments under the
"Settlement Agreement", McBrides were forced to pursue their
claims to judgment.
A non-jury trial was held January 30, 1987, at which Mr.
Larry Blake, an officer at Southern Utah Title Company, and Dr.
Atkin, testified.

On April 9, 1987, the District Court entered

its "Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law" and its "Judgment"
(R 84-90) .
The trial court found from the testimony of Larry Blake and
Dr. Atkin that Carter committed at least five fraudulent acts,

and listed them as follows:
(1) Representing to Larry Blake, an officer of
Southern Utah Title Company, and to Dr. Lee Atkin, to whom
said defendants were obligated on other matters, that
plaintiffs owed $10,112.67 to said defendants when, in fact,
the defendants knew that plaintiffs had already paid in full
and that no money was then owed to defendants by plaintiffs.
(2) Advising and requesting plaintiffs to make
payments directly to Steven R. Carter, even though said
defendant knew that payments were to be made to Southern
Utah Title Company as the escrow agent and that this
violated the Escrow Agreement. Further, by accepting and
cashing payments from plaintiffs without notifying the
escrow agent as required by the agreement.
(3) Granting and signing a Trust Deed in favor of Dr.
Lee C. Atkin and his wife on January 21, 1983 for $39,733.50
covering plaintiff's property, even though said defendants
knew the plaintiffs had already completely paid for said
property on or before November 15, 1982, and were entitled
under the real estate contract to a Warranty Deed from
defendants free and clear of all liens and encumbrances. By
reason of this Trust Deed, the Court finds that the
plaintiffs were required to purchase their property a second
time at the trust deed foreclosure sale conducted by the
Atkin's attorney.
(4) Failing to sign and record a Warranty Deed upon
tull payment by plaintiffs in November, 1982, and by
delaying the signing and recording of said deed until July 5,
1983 after the fraudulent Trust Deed was already recorded.
(5) Preparing, signing, and mailing to plaintiffs,
when pressured to do so by Atkins, a Notice of Default dated
July 6, 1984, and intentionally mailed to an address that
the defendants knew was an old address for plaintiffs and
that plaintiffs would not receive such notice, all to delay
the discovery of defendants fraudulent acts, and all done
when defendants knew there was no default, but that, in
fact, plaintiffs had paid in full for their property in
November, 19 82.
The trial court found McBrides1 damages to be $23,000 for
being forced to purchase their property a second time at the
Atkin foreclosure sale, $5,740.00 for attorney's fees, and
$286.31 for costs, for total damages of 529,026.51.

The trial

court also found punitive damages to be appropriate, and awarded
$5,000.00 as punitive damages, making the total judgment

$34,026.51.

The trial court, in its conclusions of law, stated:

"Said judgment is based upon five transactions of fraud and
misrepresentation, as set forth in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of
the findings of fact."
Likewise, the judgment itself recites that it is "based upon five
transactions of fraud and misrepresentation".
After attempts to collect on the judgment from Carter failed
to produce anything, McBrides filed a petition pursuant to UCA §
61-2a-5 with the District Court seeking an order requiring the
payment of $29,026.51 from the Recovery Fund.

The requested

amount included attorney's fees and costs, but did not include
the $5,000.00 in punitive damages as they are not "actual
damages".

The Division objected to the recovery of any amount

over $10,000.
Hearing was held on July 12, 1988, and the District Court
ruled that all conditions for recovery had been met and that each
of the four McBrides were entitled to recover up to $10,000.00
from the Recovery Fund.

The Court ruled that no attorney!s fees

or costs were recoverable because the statute in effect at the
time the petition was filed had recently been amended to
expressly disallow punitive damages, attorney's fees, interest
and costs.

Therefore, the Court ordered that only $23,000.00 be

paid to McBrides from the Recovery Fund, with $5,7b0.00 to be
paid to each of them.
The Court's findings supporting this order were as follows
(R 158-160):
1. That plaintiffs have filed a
have met all conditions precedent and
required by law for recovery from the
fund. Further, that the Division, in

proper petition and
ail conditions
real estate recovery
its response to the

petition, has acknowledged that plaintiffs are entitled to
receive 510,000.00 from the recovery fund. The Division
contends that recovery is limited to $10,000.00 because
there was only one transaction and that multiple claimaints
harmed by one transaction are limited to $10,000.00 and must
share therein.
2. The Court finds that the applicable Utah statute
should be the statute in effect at the time plaintiffs filed
their petition for recovery from the real estate recovery
fund, and not the statute in effect at the time the original
complaint against the real estate licensee was filed or the
statute in effect at the time the final judgment was entered
against the real estate licensee.
3. The Court finds that plaintiffs sustained actual
damages of $23,000.00 which were included in the $34,026.31
judgment against the real estate licensee. The Court further
finds that none of the judgment has been collected.
4. The Court finds that the statute in effect when the
petition was filed on or about May 16, 1988 does not allow
recovery for punitive damages, attorney's fees, interest or
Court costs and that plaintiffs cannot recover more than
$23,000.00 from the recovery fund.
5. The Court finds that the Utah Real Estate Recovery
Fund Act is not clear in reference to instances where there
are multiple claimants, but finds from the wording of the
statute, Section 61-2a-5 of the Utah Code, that references
therein that "A person may bring a claim. . ." and "If the
person making a claim . . . " and also " . . . the person
making the claim . . . " are all references to a single
individual and that each individual who has sustained actual
damages may bring a claim against the recovery fund with
each claim being limited by the statute to $10,000.00 for a
single transaction.
6. The Court finds that each of the four individual
plaintiffs has suffered actual damages of $5,750.00 (being
one-fourth of the 223,000.00 actual damages included in the
judgment) and that each is entitled to receive $5,750.00 from the
real estate recovery fund.
7. The Court further finds that the statute is
remedial and intended to protect the public against loss
resulting from fraud, misrepresentation or deceit by real estate
licensees and should therefore be given a liberal construction to
promote that purpose."
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Division seeks to limit recovery to $10,000 on their
theory that UCA § 61-2a-5(l) means that when only one parcel of
real estate is involved, there can only be one "transaction" of
fraud, misrepresentation or deceit by the real estate licensee,

even when the licensee may have committed several fraudulent acts
over a period of years relating to that parcel of land.
In terms of policy, the Division's position is untenable and
would effectively render the Real Estate Recovery Fund Act
ineffectual.

It would frustrate the declared purpose of the Act

to provide compensation to the public out of the Fund for damages
caused by real estate licensees.

The Division's interpretation

would make it extremely difficult to obtain recovery and, when
weighing the costs versus the benefits of seeking recovery, would
discourage most, if not all, members of the public who were the
intended beneficiaries of the Act.

This would be so because of

the $10,000 recovery limitation would then have to be prorated
among a group of victims, and also because the procedural
requirements and prerequisites are too burdensome.

The victims

would have to finance the petition, and would know, going in,
that none of their costs, attorney's fees, or interest on their
claims can be recovered.
Respondents contend that the District Court correctly ruled
that each of the individual respondents could recover up to the
$10,000.00 limit.

The plain wording of the statute, Section

61-2a-5, supports the interpretation that each person may bring a
claim by its frequent reference to "a person" or "the person".
If the legislature had intended to require multiple victims to
aggregate their claims, it could have described those injured by
a licensee's fraudulent conduct in a real estate transaction as
"victims" or "claimants".

Even better, the legislature could

have done what California did — add a specific dollar limitation

per licensee that applies " . . . regardless of the number of
persons aggrieved or parcels of real estate involved in a
transaction . . .". (§ 10474 of the Business and Professions
Code).
An independent ground for sustaining the trial courtfs
ruling applies even if multiple claimants are required to
aggregate their claims.

The Division is precluded by the

doctrines of res judicata, waiver, and estoppel from challenging
the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the
District Court on April 9, 1987.

Respondents make this

contention on the grounds that the Division was given written
notice of the complaint against the real estate licensee at the
time the action was commenced [as required by UCA § 61-2a-5(l)],
but the Division tailed to intervene in the action to protect the
interests now being asserted.

Those findings, entered April 9,

1987, specifically found that the real estate licensee committed
five separate fraudulent acts and concluded that the judgment
against said licensee was "... based upon five transactions of
fraud and misrepresentation, as set forth in paragraphs 5, 6 and
7 of the findings of fact."
Respondents also argue attorney's fees and costs should have
been included in the Order because the District Court erroneous
applied the statute in effect when the petition was filed seeking
payment from the Fund (petition filed in May, 1988) instead of
the statute in effect in January and February, 1986 when the
cause of action arose and notice was given to the Division.
1987, between those dates, UCA § 61-2a-5(l) was amended by

In

adding, among other things, a sentence stating:

"Recovery from

the fund may not include punitive damages, attorney's fees,
interest or court costs."

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DIVISION'S INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE IS NOT SOUND
POLICY AND WOULD RENDER THE STATUTE INEFFECTUAL.
The Division's suggested construction of the statute
limiting recovery to $10,000 regardless of the number of victims
when there is only one parcel of real property or where several
fraudulent acts are committed over a period of time but relating
to one overall transaction, imposes such great hardship on
victims that it would be bad policy and would make it so
difficult to qualify under the statute that the statute would
become meaningless.

The Division's interpretation would require

the victims, in every case, to pay their own costs and attorney's
fees while completing all of the following steps, before any
recovery could be obtained:
1.

File a lawsuit against the licensee alleging fraud,

misrepresentation and deceit, causes of action which require
proof by clear and convincing evidence.
2.

Provide the Division with written notice at the time the

action is commenced against the real estate licensee as required
by UCA § 61-2a-5(1).
3.

Be prepared and willing to incur, at their own expense,

the extra attorney's fees, interest and costs, not to mention
delay in the litigation, that might result if the Division

exercises its "unconditional right to intervene in the action."
See Section 62-2a-5(l).
4.

Succeed in the litigation by obtaining a judgment based

upon fraud, misrepresentation or deceit.
5.

Prevail thereafter in all proceedings including appeals.

6.

Pursue all collection efforts available against the real

estate licensee, including writs of execution, and make
reasonable searches and inquiries to find assets to satisfy the
judgment and exercise reasonable diligence to secure payment from
the real estate licensee.
7.

Be willing to pay the extra costs and attorney's fees to

prepare and file a verified petition with the district court
requesting payment of the uncollected actual damages only (forget
about punitive damages, attorney's fees, interest and costs).
8.

Prevail at the hearing on said petition by obtaining an

order directing payment from the fund, but be prepared to be
limited to your pro rata share of no more than $10,000.00.
9.

Be prepared to defend your victory if the Division

appeals by paying your attorney, at your own expense and with no
hope of obtaining attorney's fees no matter how the appeal turns
out, and be prepared to forgo interest during all of this time.
It is interesting to note that the Fall, 1984 edition of the
Utah Real Estate News, a publication of the Utah Real Estate
Division, states, on page 1:
"In 1974 the legislature authorized the establishment of the
Real Estate Recovery Fund in lieu of the requirement for
brokers to maintain a surety bond. The purpose of the fund
was to reimburse, within certain limits, members of the
public when the offending licensee was guilty of fraud,
misrepresentation or deceit and had no assets that could be

attached. Very few members of the public have, to date,
employed the fund and indeed many are unaware that the fund
exists to provide some relief for their loss."
The legislature authorized the Division to charge brokers up
to $18.00 a year and sales agents up to $12.00 a year to finance
the fund (UCA § 61-2a-4).

The same edition of the Utah Real

Estate News said, on page 5, that the fund "is of sufficient size
to pay all anticipated claims during the next 18-24 months" and
stated that over the last several years claims against the fund
had been inordinately few.

As a result, it was announced that:

"Effective October 1, 1984 the contribution made into the
Recovery Fund by brokers and salesagents when they obtain or
renew a license will be reduced from $15.00 to $2.00 for
brokers and from $10.00 to $1.00 for salespersons."
During the first 10 years of the fund's existence, from 1976
through the Spring of 1986, the total recovery fund payments made
to individuals damaged by a real estate licensee came to
$229,818.45, according to information in the Spring, 1985 editon
and the April, 1986 edition of the Utah Real Estate News.

The

yearly average then, is $22,981.85. According to the March, 1989
edition, there are now over 14,000 licensees in Utah, which means
that the average cost per licensee ($22,981.85 divided by 14,000)
is only $1.64 per year.

No doubt this beats the cost of bonding.

The actual net costs of the program may be much lower, because
before a licensee can obtain a new license, he must fully
reimburse the recovery fund.

Further, the Division is

"subrogated to all the rights of the judgment creditor for the
amounts paid out of the fund" (see UCA § 61-2a-9).
The compelling conclusion is that there is plenty of room to
liberally construe the statute to promote its purposes without

threatening to bankrupt the fund, as the appellant's brief
suggests (page 7) would happen.
In this matter, McBrides1 reasonable attorney's fees, as
found at trial, were $5,740.00. Add to that the fees for
collection efforts, filing the petition for recovery from the
fund, and for this appeal, and it can be seen that if McBrides
are limited to $10,000.00, they may not recover enough to even
pay costs and fees.

POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED UCA §61-2a-5(l) TO
ALLOW EACH INJURED PARTY TO A REAL ESTATE TRANSACTION TO
RECOVER UP TO $10,000 AGAINST A LICENSEE, LIMITED TO A
MAXIMUM OF $50,000 PER LICENSEE.
Booth v. Robinson 195 Cal. Rptr. 130, 147 Cal. App. 3d 371
(1983) was a case dealing with the Real Estate Fund under the
California Business and Professions Code.

The Superior Court

found that Robinson, a broker, defrauded Booth in two
transactions, and ordered recovery on both.

On appeal, the Court

set forth the standards for review of this type of case as
follows:
"A judgment or order of the superior court is presumed
correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to
support it on matters as to which the record is silent and
error must be affirmatively shown. . . . This court must
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party giving him every reasonable inference and
resolving conflicts in support of the judgment."
The wording of the Utah statute consistently refers to
individuals, starting off with "A person may bring a claim. . ."
and continues to refer to "the person", clearly implying that
each injured person may bring a claim.

The district court's

interpretation is therefore consistent with the plain language
and ordinary meaning of the words used.

This interpretation

fully comports with the rule of construction set forth in UCA §
68-3-11, which requires words and phrases to be construed
according to the context and the approved usage of the language.
In fact, according to Utah Attorney General Informal Opinion
85-30, Utah State Bulletin 85-13, p. 31 (06/03/85) it is a
cardinal rule of statutory construction that statutes must be
given their usual, ordinary, plain, natural and common meaning,
and UCA § 68-3-11 gives legislative sanction to this very rule.
The interpretation the Division seeks is unreasonable.

For

example, if a developer constructed a commercial high rise office
building, and listed it with a licensee to sell or lease the
200-300 offices, and if that licensee obtained down payments or
deposits from perhaps 100 prospective buyers or tenants, who do
not even know each other, over a 2-3 year period, and converted
the money to his personal use, then under the Division's
interpretation of the statute, since only one parcel of real
property is involved and since there was only one listing
agreement, the 100 victims could only recover a total of only
$10,000, or $100 each.

Worse yet, if one of the victims was

extra vigilant, thst victim might quickly obtain judgment and
petition for recovery and receive the full $10,000, leaving the
slower 99 victims, who might later obtain their judgments and
file their petitions, to be turned down cold because the $10,000
allowed for that "transaction", that one parcel of property and
that one listing, had already been paid.

The statute provides protection for the Recovery Fund in the
case of a licensee with multiple victims by limiting the recovery
to $50,000 against each licensee.

The license of any real estate

licensee for whom payment from the fund is made is automatically
revoked (see UCA § 61-2a-9), so it is not likely that licensees
could continue committing offenses obligating the Recovery Fund.
It is more likely that there would be multiple victims of a
licensee's fraud.

For this reason the statute has the limitation

of $50,000 per licensee.

The largest amount paid out of the fund

through April, 1986 for any one licensee was $40,000.00 paid for
licensee Robert D. Quayle, consisting of four payments of
$10,000.00 each, all paid on October 4, 1984 (Spring, 1985
edition of the Utah Real Estate News).

By providing a maximum of

$50,000 per licensee and by automatically revoking licenses, the
legislature shows that it clearly intended to allow each
individual victim to recovery up to $10,000 until the $50,000
limit is reached.
The district court found that the Utah Real Estate Recovery
Fund Act was remedial in nature and should be given a liberal
construction to promote its purposes (R 160). The name of the
act is the "Real Estate Recovery Fund Act" (Section 61-2a-l) and
its first stated purpose, set forth in Section 61-2a-2(l), is to
reimburse the public for damages caused by defaulting licensees.
Remedial statutes are to be given a liberal construction to
advance, rather than limit, their purposes.

In Booth v.

Robinson, supra, dealing with the California section equivalent
to Utahfs Section 61-2a-5 of the Act, the Court stated:
"Section 10471 is a remedial statute.

It is intended to

nml-ppf thp nnbl ic aaainst loss resultina from

estate brokers who are unable to respond to damage awards.
It is to be given a liberal construction. Remedial statutes
are to be construed to promote their purposes and protect
persons within their purview. Relief will be granted unless
clearly forbidden by statute. The statute will be construed
when its meaning is doubtful so as to suppress the mischief
at which it is directed, to advance or extend the remedy
provided, and to bring within the scope of the law every
case which comes clearly within its spirit and policy."
(Citations omitted).
The plain language of the statute, logic and common sense,
along with the rule of construction for remedial statutes, all
support the judgment of the district court.

If the Utah

legislature had intended to limit the statute the way the
Division contends, it could have easily done so, just as the
California legislature did.

In 1969, the California legislature

added a limitation not found in the Utah statute.

This

limitation completely distinguishes the McBrides1 case from the
Division's main case of Dombalian v. Fox, 152 Cal. Rptr. 86, 88
Cal. App. 3d 763 (1979) . The Division relies heavily upon
Dombalian, citing it as a case "construing similar Real Estate
Recovery Fund statutes" (p. 12, Appellant's Brief) to support
thg argument that recovery is limited to 510,000 where there are
multiple victims on one parcel of real estate.

In actual fact,

the California and Utah statutes are different, and not similar,
in one critical respect.

The Dombalian opinion distinguishes

itself from the Utah statute by stating, on page 88, referring to
the California legislature, that:
"In 1969 (Stats. 1969, ch. 729, § 2, p. 1463) it [the
legislature] amended section 10471 by adding the proviso
that 'nothing shall be construed to obligate [the fund] for
more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per transaction
regardless of the number of persons aggrieved or parcels of
real estate involved in such transaction1." (Emphasis
Added).

The underlined part in the above quote is not found in the
Utah statute.

Utah's statute is not written to impose a $10,000

limit where four persons are injured, as McBrides have been, by a
licensee on a single parcel of real estate.

If Utah had the same

limitation, the Division's argument would have some merit.

If

the Division desires the same limitation that applies in
California, as its argument on appeal suggests, then that is a
matter it should take up with the legislature, and not attempt to
to have the Supreme Court twist the statute to its liking.
The California statute has other limitations not found in
the Utah statute.

For example, Section 10471 requires that the

licensee not only must be licensed at the time of the commission
of the fraudulent acts giving rise to recovery, but also that the
licensee "performed acts for which that license was required".
Many California cases have denied recovery on the grounds that no
license was required in the transactions under scrutiny.

The

Utah act allows recovery against a licensee for fraud or deceit
11

in any real estate transaction11, Section 61-2a-5(l).

The Utah

law has a much broader coverage than the California law, and
the District Court was correct in permitting each of the McBrides
to recover under the act.

POINT III
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE JUDGMENT WAS BASED
UPON FIVE TRANSACTIONS OF FRAUD IS FINAL, AND RES JUDICATA,
AND THE DIVISION WAIVED ITS OPPORTUNITY TO INTERVENE TO
CHALLENGE THOSE FINDINGS. THIS IS AN INDEPENDENT BASIS UPON

WHICH RECOVERY OF $10,000 PER TRANSACTION SHOULD BE ALLOWED,
LIMITED TO $50,000 PER LICENSEE AND LIMITED TO McBRIDE'S
ACTUAL JUDGMENT.
The Division was served with notice of the action McBrides
were commencing against Carter (R 97, 107-110)•

Section

61-2a-5(l) of the Utah Code gives the Division the unconditional
right to intervene in the action.

By intervening in the action,

the Division could, if appropriate, attempt to limit recovery
from the fund by showing that the requisite fraud was lacking in
the transaction or by limiting the number of transactions
involved.

The Division did not choose to intervene in the

lawsuit between McBrides and Carter.
The lawsuit proceeded to trial on January 30, 1987 and the
trial court entered its findings and judgment April 9, 1987,
stating in both the findings and the judgment that its judgment
against Carter was based upon five transactions of fraud and
misrepresentation.

The findings and judgment became final and

are res judicata as to the parties actually named and properly
served therein, as well as to the Division, which received notice
and elected not to exercise its right to intervene.
However, the Division did act on the complaints McBrides
filed with the Division against Carter, and revoked his license
for failure to remit funds and for dishonest dealings.

The

Division's report of their disciplinary action (R 110) mentions
three of his fraudulent transactions (1) failing to apply some of
McBrides1 payments to the contractual obligation; (2) after being
tully paid by McBrides but before deeding McBrides the property,
Carter assigned the contract and pledged the property as security

by placing a $39,733.50 Trust Deed against it; and (3) by failing
to pay the debt represented by the Trust Deed, the property was
sold at a foreclosure sale.
It seems difficult to understand how the Division can
describe Carter's conduct in three transactions in the
disciplinary action, and still maintain that there was only one
transaction for purposes of the Recovery Act.
Carter failed to account for at least three of the annual
payments made by McBrides, which is why the escrow records showed
a balance of $10,112.67 when in truth the contract was fully
paid.

These three fraudulent acts were lumped by the trial court

into one transaction of fraud.

The Division contends that these

acts and the other four set forth in the findings are really all
one transaction of fraud.

That doesn't make sense.

If a person

defrauds a bank by forgery three times over an eight year period
(Carter took three payments over an eight year period without
applying them to the obligation), is it one crime or three?
answer is obvious.

The

In actual fact then, there were not five

transactions of fraud, but seven.
These separate and identifiable transactions of fraud
constitute independent ground for sustaining the trial court's
ruling.

Thus, the judgment should be affirmed even if multiple

claimants are required to aggregate their claims.
The Division contends that if there is only one parcel of
property involved, no matter how many fraudulent acts a licensee
might perpetrate regarding it, there is only one "transaction" as
far as the Recovery Act is concerned.

The California case of

Booth v. Robinson, supra, illustrates the Division's erroneous
thinking.

In this case, the Court found two separate

transactions of fraud without any parcel of real property being
involved.

In Booth, the licensee, Robinson, obtained $15,000

from Booth upon promises to invest the money in real estate that
would produce an income of $150.00 a month.

A few months later,

Robinson obtained another $3,500.00 from Booth on promises that
with the money Robinson could take over a house and double
Booth's money when the house was sold.

Robinson disappeared with

the money and never did invest either the $15,000 or the $3,500
in any real estate.

The trial court held that there were two

transactions and granted Booth's application, awarding $10,000.00
as to the first transaction (the limit of recovery for one
transaction) and $3,500 plus interest as to the second
transaction, and their costs.

In doing so, the Court stated:

"That Robinson never in fact made the investments for the
Booths does not preclude recovery for she had assumed to do
so."
The Division cannot attack that judgment more than a year
after it became final.

The finding of five fraudulent

transactions, whether right or wrong, is now res judicata.
Doctrines of waiver, estoppel and laches bar the Division's late
attack on those findings.

Since there were five transactions of

fraud, McBrides are entitled to recover up to $10,000.00 for each
one, limited to the $50,000.00 cap per licensee.

The $23,000.00

ordered by the trial court is well within that overall
limitation.

POINT IV
THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE APPLIED THE STATUTE IN EFFECT
AT THE TIME McBRIDEfS CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE AND NOTICE WAS
GIVEN TO THE DIVISION, APPLYING THE CORRECT STATUTE ALLOWS
McBRIDES TO RECOVER THE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS INCLUDED
IN THEIR JUDGMENT AGAINST CARTER.
The McBride's cause of action against Carter arose upon
their discovery of the Trust Deed he caused to be recorded
against the property they had purchased from him.

This discovery

was made shortly before the foreclosure sale held on January 16,
1986.

Upon further investigation, it was discovered that he had

received at least three annual payments without applying them to
the contractual obligation.

McBrides were forced to purchase

their property again at the foreclosure sale.

They filed their

complaint commencing this action on February 7, 1986.

It is

clear that their cause of action arose in January, 1986.
Section 61-2a-5 (1) of the Utah Code was amended between
January, 1986, when McBrides cause of action arose, and the date
of May 16, 1988 when McBrides filed their verified petition
seeking recovery from the Recovery Fund.

J. Philip

Eves, the District Court Judge, made the following conclusion of
law (R 160):
"1. That the law in effect at the time the petition for
recovery was filed in May, 1988 is the applicable law
governing this case."
The Distirct Court erred in making this conclusion of law.
The applicable law is the law in effect at the time the cause of
action against Carter arose.

Carlucci v. Utah State Industrial

Commission, 725 ,P. 2d 1335 (Utah, 1986) states the rule as
follows:
"The general rule is that the law establishing substantive
rights and liabilities when a cause of action arises, and
not a subsequently enacted statute, governs the resolution
of the dispute. (Citations omitted.) See also § 68-3-3,
which states: 'No part of these revised statutes is
retroactive, unless expressly so declared.1"
The material change in the statute, insofar as this case is
concerned, was the addition of the following sentence to Section
61-2a-5(1):
"Recovery from the fund may not include punitive damages,
attorneyfs fees, interest or court costs."
Because of the addition of this sentence, Judge Eves refused
to order the Division to pay the $5,740.00 attorney's fees and
the $286.31 costs that were included in the April 9, 1987
judgment against Carter and were part of the $29,026.31 being
sought in the verified petition (R 96-110).
Since notice to the Division must be given concurrently with
the filing of a lawsuit against a licensee as a prerequisite for
a later petition for recovery, the law at the time of the notice
should logically apply.

Otherwise, it is conceivable that the

Division could receive notice of a batch of claims against
licensees, and have the statute amended to exclude such claims
from recovery in the year or more it may take to prosecute the
claims to judgment, and then when the petitions are later filed,
deny recovery.
The next question is whether or not the $5,740.00 in fees
and the $286.31 in costs should be ordered paid from the Recovery
Fund even if the correct law is applied.

The Division will be

quick to argue that even the old statute does not allow
attorney's fees and costs because it provides as follows:
"Recovery from the fund shall be for the actual damages
included in the judgment and unpaid, but not more than
$10,000 for a single transaction and no more than $50,000
for any one licensee."
McBrides respond that their fees and costs are an element of
their actual damages just as surely as the $23,000.00 they
incurred to obtain their property through foreclosure.

Allowance

of attorney's tees as damages in quiet title actions has been
approved, see South Sanpitch Company v> Pack 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 2
(Filed December 13, 1988).

McBrides were forced to quiet their

title by purchasing their property a second time at the
foreclosure sale. Allowance of attorney's fees as damages has
also been recognized in several other situations, such as damages
for breach of contract Pacific Coast Title Ins. Co. v. Hartford
Accident & Ind. Co., 7 Utah 2d 377, 325 P.2d 906 (1958); and even
in instances of negligence, commonly referred to as the
third-party tort rule (South Sanpitch, supra).

Carter certainly

breached the Uniform Real Estate Contract (Exhibit P-2) and the
findings of fraud and misrepresentation establish a tort basis
for the fees as damages.
It should be emphasized that McBrides are not seeking
attorney's fees and costs in connection with their petition for
recovery from the Recovery Fund or for their fees on this appeal
(although perhaps they should), but only for their attorney's
fees incurred in obtaining judgment against Carter.
Rules of statutory construction support McBrides1 position
that they should have recovered their fees and costs under the

former statute, even though its language is "actual damages".
This is so because the amendment of a statute is presumed to
effect a change in the original act by either creating new rights
or taking away existing ones.

This rule of statutory

construction is stated in Volume 1A, Sutherland, Statutory
Construction (4th ed. 1973) §22.30, p. 178 as follows:
"The mere fact that the legislature enacts an amendment
indicates that it thereby intended to change the original
act by creating a new right or withdrawing an existing one.
Therefore, any material change in the language of the
original act is presumed to indicate a change in legal
rights."
Therefore, it must be presumed that prior to the amendment,
recovery of attorney's fees, interest and costs was available,
and now, by force of the amendment, those items can no longer be
recovered.
Of course, McBrides acknowledge that the term "actual
damages" in the applicable statute does not include punitive
damages, and therefore McBrides did not request recovery of the
$5,000.00 awarded as punitive damages when they filed their
petition.

They seek only the inclusion of their fees and costs

as damages in the payment from the Recovery Fund.
California cases have allowed costs and interest under their
statute which has, since 1968, limited recovery to "actual and
direct loss to the claimant in the transaction" (Section 10471 of
the Business and Professions Code).

In Dierenfield v. Stabile

243 Cal. Rptr. 598, (Cal. App. 1988) the court held that "actual
and direct loss" did not allow the victims to recover the benefit

of the bargain, but that it did authorize recovery of amounts
necessary to restore them to their former situation, saying:
"Viewed as a whole we find that the statutory scheme is not
intended to ensure that applicants recover profits, rather
the intent is to prevent applicants from suffering losses on
money actually paid. Therefore we hold that the applicant
should be placed in the same position in which he or she
would have been if the transaction had never occurred.
•

• .

Under this rule the applicant's recovery from the fund is
limited to the amount of the principal actually paid out
plus interest at the statutory rate from the date the
principal is paid out until the date it is returned."
McBrides, of course, would not have incurred any attorney's
fees or Court costs if Carter had not defrauded them.

Therefore,

in order to place McBrides in the same position they would have
been in if the transaction had never occurred, they must recover
their attorney's fees and costs.
In Nordahl v. Franzalia 121 Cal. Rptr. 794, 47 Cal. App. 3d
592 (1975) the evolution of the California statute was discussed.
In 1968 an amendment substituted "actual and direct loss" for
"actual damages".

Regarding the original language of "actual

damages" the court said:
"This language was ambiguous since the words "actual
damages" could have referred as well to the amount actually
awarded in the judgment as to the amount of damage actually
suffered."
The language in Utah's statute is still "actual damages", and is
similarly ambiguous.

When a remedial statute is ambiguous, it

should be given a liberal construction.

Doing so in this case

compels the conclusion that McBrides should be entitled to
recover all the damages awarded in the judgment against Carter
except for the punitive damages, amounting to $29,026.31.

The following statements from the Nordahl opinion are
equally applicable to justify the inclusion of attorney's fees,
interest and costs in McBride f s situation:
"Though the recovery thereby permitted is intended to be
limited in nature (a limit of 510,000 per transaction is
imposed), there can be no question but that the purpose of
section 10471 of the Business and Professions Code is
remedial. . . . Within the limitation stated it must,
therefore, be given a liberal construction. . . .
Liberally construed, the language of section 10471
authorizes the inclusion of both the interest and the costs
under the circumstances of this case. . . . "When, by
virtue of the fraud or breach of fiduciary duty of the
defendant, a plaintiff has been deprived of the use of his
money or property and is obliged to resort to litigation to
recover it, the inclusion of interest in the award is
necessary in order to make the plaintiff whole."
Not only should the Supreme Court add the fees of $5,740.00
and costs of $286.31 to McBrides1 recovery of $23,000, but
interest on the $23,000 from the April 9, 1987 judgment date to
date of payment should be included.

McBride's are still not

whole, having been required to bear the costs and attorney's fees
cf petitioning the Recovery Fund and for zhe

costs and attorney's

fees on this appeal.

CONCLUSION
The District Court properly allowed each person to maintain
a claim for damages against the Recovery Fund, giving a liberal
construction to the remedial statute.

The decision cf the

District Ccurt is also proper on a transactional basis, as there
were at least five transactions of fraud, each with a $10,000
limit against licensee Carter, more than sufficient to cover
uhe damages tc FcBrides.
The District Ccurt should have aoclied the statute in effect

when the cause of action arose.

Applying the proper statute

permits McBrides1 attorney's fees and costs that were included
in the judgment against Carter to be recovered as damages,
together with interest thereon.
THEREFORE, the McBrides request the Court to affirm the
District Court's decision as far as it went, but to also include
fees, costs and interest in the allowable recoveryRESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /*7

day of May, 1989.
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